

Message Text

SECRET POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03488 01 OF 02 161346Z

44

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 /026 W

----- 078842

O 161229Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8185

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 3488

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS-3

TAGS: PARM,US,UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

TTBT/PNE DELEGATIONS MESSAGE NUMBER FORTY-SIX

1. FOLLOWING IS THE DELEGATION'S GENERAL SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS TO DATE.

2. GENERAL.

(A) SOVIET VIEW IS THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED "STEP BY STEP" WITH AGREEMENT BEING REACHED FIRST ON YIELD LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE CONDITIONED ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS ON VERIFICATION WOULD THEN FOLLOW. LESS HAS BEEN SAID THAN IN ROUND I ABOUT COOPERATION. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE TOPIC OF COOPERATION WOULD BE A PROMINENT SUBJECT OF SOVIET STATEMENTS IN DEFINITIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO OBSERVERS; HOWEVER, THE EVENTUAL FORM AND STRENGTH OF THE COUPLING BETWEEN VERIFICATION AND COOPERATION IS NOT CLEAR. US HAS TAKEN POSITION THAT LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION GO TOGETHER, AND THAT COOPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN UP AFTER THESE TWO PRIORITY MATTERS ARE IN HAND.

(B) DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN UNIFORMLY CORDIAL IN TONE.

3. CONCERNING CONTAINED PNES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03488 01 OF 02 161346Z

(A) BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ABSOLUTE YIELD CEILING (NO QUOTA OF EXPLOSIONS ABOVE

THIS LIMIT) ON CONTAINED PNES, WITH THIS LIMIT TO APPLY TO ANY INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION. THIS LIMIT WOULD ALSO APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE YIELD OF ANY GROUP EXPLOSION FOR WHICH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED AND THEIR YIELDS MEASURED BY AGREED-UPON VERIFICATION PROCEDURES.

(B) US PROPOSAL FOR THIS YIELD CEILING IS 100 KILOTONS; SOVIET PROPOSAL IS 150 KILOTONS.

(C) BOTH SIDES HAVE PRESENTED THEIR LISTS OF INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THE TYPES OF CONTAINED EVENTS DESCRIBED IN (A) ABOVE. THESE LISTS, THOUGH NOT IDENTICAL, ARE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME EXCEPT THAT SOVIET SCHEME DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR EXCHANGE OF GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION FOR EVENTS SMALLER THAN 50-70 KILOTONS.

(D) SOVIET SIDE HAS NOT MADE DEFINITIVE REPLY TO US POINT THAT OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS MUST ALSO BE PROVIDED FOR THE TYPES OF CONTAINED PNES DESCRIBED IN (A) ABOVE. US HAS STATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE OBSERVER RIGHTS TO VERIFY PURPOSE, GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION, AND DEPTH. US POSITION ON OBSERVERS MAKES NO REFERENCE TO YIELD LEVELS.

(E) SOVIET SIDE HAS INITIATED DISCUSSION OF THEIR PROPOSAL THAT CONTAINED GROUP EVENTS WITH AGGREGATE YIELD LARGER THAN 100 (150) KILOTONS BE ALLOWED ON CONDITION THAT PROJECT IS SO DESIGNED THAT INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND THEIR YIELDS MEASURED. THEY HAVE STATED THAT INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED IN ADVANCE ON EMPLACEMENTS AND YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS, AND THEY HAVE STATED THAT FEASIBLE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES CAN IDENTIFY AND MEASURE INDIVIDUAL YIELDS IN GROUP ARRAYS AS THEY WOULD BE DESIGNED BY THEM. THEY HAVE NOT DESCRIBED THESE PROCEDURES AND THEY HAVE NOT SET FORTH THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE DESIGN OF GROUP ARRAYS THAT WOULD BE FOLLOWED IN ORDER TO MAKE VERIFICATION PRACTICAL. THEY HAVE SAID THAT VERIFICATION WOULD BE BASED ON USE OF ON-SITE INSTRUMENTS (PRIVATELY INDICATING THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE OBSERVERS). THEY HAVE STATED THAT THEY WILL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03488 01 OF 02 161346Z

SET FORTH PUHXCTMQESIGN STIPULATIONS WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN PROJECTS IN WAYS TO ENABLE VERIFICATION.

(F) COMMENT: IT IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS ON ALLOWABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTAINED GROUPS, AT LEAST IN ORDER TO AVOID FUTURE AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CLOSELY SPACED (IN DISTANCE AND TIME) EXPLOSIONS. LARGER ISSUE RAISED BY SOVIET PROPOSAL IS WHETHER OR NOT VERIFICATION FOR CONTAINED SIMULTANEOUS GROUPS AGGREGATING MORE THAN 100 (150) KILOTONS CAN BE DONE WITH SUFFICIENT ASSURANCE TO MAKE SUCH

EVENTS ALLOWABLE, AND THIS IN TURN DEPENDS UPON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADEQUACY OF A SYSTEM OF CONSTRAINTS ON THE CONFIGURATIONS TO BE PERMITTED FOR SUCH PROJECTS AND THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR. SOVIET PRESENTATIONS THUS FAR ON CONTAINED GROUPS OVER 100 (150) KILOTONS HAVE BEEN INCOMPLETE AND SEEMINGLY UNCOORDINATED. ONE CLEAR PART IS SOVIET PREMISE THAT ON-SITE INSTRUMENTATION IS ESSENTIAL IF VERIFICATION IS TO BE FEASIBLE.

4. CONCERNING EXCAVATION PNES:

(A) US SIDE HAS PROPOSED: SALVO LIMIT OF 500 KILTONS; UNSPECIFIED LIMIT ON YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS; FISSION YIELD LIMIT OF 0.2 KILOTON IN EACH EXPLOSIVE; MINIMUM DEPTH OF BURIAL OF 30 METERS TIME THE CUBE ROOT OF YIELD IN KILTONS; INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ITEMS AS FOR CONTAINED PNES; AND OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN FOR CONTAINED PNES, INCLUDING ON-SITE COLLECTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SAMPLES.

(B) SOVIET SIDE HAS RESPONDED WITH: A LIMIT OF 500 KILOTONS FOR INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS; ALLOWANCE OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS OVER THIS CEILING; UNLIMITED SALVO YIELD AS STATED IN PLENARY BUT WITH PRIVATE INDICATIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A ONE MEGATON LIMIT. THEY HAVE ALSO STATED IN PRIVATE THAT THEY SEE NO TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH LIMITATION ON FISSION YIELD AND DEPTH OF BURIAL, AND THAT US CAN ASSUME THEY WILL ACCEPT THESE LIMITATIONS.

(C) HEAD OF SOVIET DELEGATION HAS STATED PRIVATELY THAT SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT COLLECTION OF RADIOACTIVE SAMPLES BY OBSERVERS, ON GROUNDS THAT (I) THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO ACCESS TO EXPLOSIVES DESIGN INFORMATION, AND (II) THEY COULD NOT BE SURE THAT US WOULD HOLD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 03488 01 OF 02 161346Z

INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL WITH RESPECT TO THIRD PARTIES. HE HAS ALSO MADE QUALIFIED PRIVATE STATEMENTS THAT TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS BY OBSERVERS MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

(D) FURTHER, ON THE PROPOSED FISSION-YIELD LIMITATION, SOVIETS HAVE IN PRIVATE: -- ASKED IF US COULD NOT VERIFY THIS LIMITATION "AT A DISTANCE" RATHER THAN ON-SITE (US REPLY: NO). -- ASKED IF FISSION YIELD COULD NOT BE SPECIFIED AS A RANGE RATHER THAN A SINGLE NUMBER, ON GROUNDS THAT THEIR EXPERTS ESTIMATE A VERY WIDE UNCERTAINTY IN DETERMINING FISSION YIELD AND THEY WANT NO "SQUABBLES" ABOUT COMPLIANCE. (US REPLY: WE EXPECT PRECISION OF FISSION-YIELD DETERMINATION TO BE ADEQUATE FOR THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE PROPOSAL FOR THIS LIMITATION.)

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03488 02 OF 02 161457Z

41

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

ERDE-00 /026 W

----- 078974

O 161229Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8186

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 3488

EXDIS

-- RAISED THE POLITICAL ISSUE OF INCLUDING IN PNE AGREEMENT A SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGICAL PARAMETER WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN BY THIRD COUNTRIES AS A CLEAR BASIS FOR SEPARATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PNE DEVICES.

-- MENTIONED, IN REFERENCE TO THIS POLITICAL ISSUE, THE POSSIBILITY OF DESCRIBING THE FISSION YIELD LIMIT AS BEING AN ACCOMMODATION TO HEALTH STANDARDS OR AS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE LTBT. (US REPLY: US PROPOSAL FOR THIS LIMITATION IS AIMED AT LIMITING WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS THAT MIGHT BE DERIVED FROM EXCAVATION PNES.)

(E) FURTHER, ON MATTER OF LIMITATION ON SALVO YIELD, SOVIETS HAVE: ARGUED THAT IT SHOULD BE UNLIMITED; AND STATED THAT FOR AGGREGATE YIELDS LIMITED TO SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOTONS, DETERMINATION OF AGGREGATE YIELD BY NTM IS SUFFICIENT VERIFICATION. FOR AGGREGATE YIELDS GREATER THAN SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOTONS ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEANS WOULD BE NEEDED TO GUARD AGAINST A NEARBY CONTAINED EXPLOSION.

5. CONCERNING OTHER ASPECTS:

(A) SOVIET SIDE IN PRIVATE SESSIONS, PARTICULARLY TIMERVAEV, HAS REPEATEDLY MENTIONED DESIRABILITY OF MAKING A START ON DRAFTING AGREEMENT LANGUAGE, EVEN IN A VERY SKETCHY WAY.

(B) SOVIET SIDE IN PRIVATE HAS STRESSED NEED FOR REFERENCE TO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03488 02 OF 02 161457Z

COOPERATION AS AN INTERGRAL PART OF AGREEMENT LANGUAGE, BUT HAS ALSO INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION IN TERMS OF EXPLICIT "SHALLS" AND WITH COOPERATION IN MORE GENERAL TERMS.

(C) IN CONTRAST WITH ROUND I, SOVIET SIDE THIS TIME HAS MADE NO TIE BETWEEN TTBT ARTICLE III AND NPT ARTICLE V.

(D) SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED IN PLENARY THAT TESTS OF EXPERIMENTAL EXPLOSIVE DEVICES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO WEAPON TEST SITES.

(E) US HAS STATED AS ONE OF ITS THREE CRITERIA THAT LTBT MUST BE OBSERVED BUT IN PRESENTING EXCAVATION POSITION HAS EXPLICITLY STATED THAT US PROPOSAL IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO SATISFY FIRST TWO OF THREE US CRITERIA, I.E., NO WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS LIMITED OR PRECLUDED BY TTBT AND VERIFICATION OF THIS FACT. SOVIETS APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND BUT HAVE MADE NO RESONSE.

6. SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD US POSITION
IN THIS ROUND, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENTS TOWARD US POSITION. THEY HAVE:

-- EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED US CRITERIA FOR PNE AGREEMENT;

-- ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A YIELD LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED SHOTS AND PROPOSED A SPECIFIC NUMBER;

-- ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A YIELD LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION SHOTS AND PROPOSED A SPECIFIC NUMBER, BUT PROPOSED A QUOTA OF SHOTS ABOVE THIS LIMIT;

-- INDICATED SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE YIELD LIMIT PROPOSED FOR EXCAVATION SHOTS;

-- PRIVATELY INDICATED THAT A 1 MT LIMIT ON AGGREGATE YIELDS OF GROUP EXCAVATION SHOTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE;

-- AGREED THAT THE AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED INTO INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMIT FOR INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS;

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03488 02 OF 02 161457Z

-- AGREED THAT, TO DETECT A CLANDESTINE CONTAINED SHOT, VERIFICATION MEANS OTHER THAN NTM WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED FOR GROUP EXCAVATION SHOTS OVER FEW HUNDRED KT;

-- SUBSTANTIALLY AGREED TO US PROPOSALS ON DATA EXCHANGE EXCEPT IN THE YIELD RANGE BELOW 50-70 KT;

-- INDICATED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WITH US PROPOSAL ON MINIMUM DEPTH OF BURIAL;

--INDICATED TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDING OF US PROPOSAL ON FISSION YIELD LIMIT AND INDICATED IT WOULD POSE NO TECHNICAL PROBLEM AS AN EXPLOSIVE DESIGN CRITERION;

-- BROADLY INDICATED THAT OBSERVERS COULD BE PERMITTED IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES;

-- STOPPED USING ARTICLE V OF NPT TO JUSTIFY SOVIET POSITION;

-- ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LIMITATIONS MUST BE ACCEPTED WHICH WILL INVOLVE ECONOMIC PENALTIES IN PNE PROJECTS.

7. ACTION

A) UNDER PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING CONTAINED SHOTS, DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS SOVIETS TO ACCEPT US PROPOSALS AND TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ON VERIFICATION QUESTIONS.

(B) WE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE AT THIS TIME IN US POSITION ON CONTAINED PNES. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON RESOLVABLE CONTAINED GROUPS LARGER THAN 100 (150) KILTONS CLEARLY INVOLVES SOME EMBRACE OF OBSERVERS; IT ALSO COULD PROVIDE LEVERAGE FOR SETTING THE BASIC YIELD LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVES AT 100 KILOTONS IF RESOLVABLE AGGREGATES LARGER THAN 100 KILOTONS ARE ALLOWED UNDER SUITABLE CONFIGURATION AND VERIFICATION CONDITIONS.

(C) SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED THAT IT IS NOT YET AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION IN DETAIL. SOVIETS PROBABLY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL INTERNAL ANALYSES BEFORE THEY CAN RESPOND FULLY TO POINTS RAISED IN THIS ROUND.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 03488 02 OF 02 161457Z

(D) ON EXCAVATION PNES, DELEGATION BELIEVES SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE THEIR PRESENT POSITION IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL WAY UNTIL US MAKES A MOVE. WE BELIEVE SOVIETS WILL EVENTUALLY ACCEPT SOME LIMIT ON AGGREGATE YIELD OF EXCAVATION GROUP SHOT AND WILL ACCEPT INDIVIDUAL LIMIT SOMEWHAT LOWER THAN 500 KT. THE MAJOR OPEN POINT OF INTEREST TO THE SOVIETS IS THE US FIGURE FOR YIELD LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL SHOTS. IF IT WERE STATED TO SOVIET SIDE THAT THERE IS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FISSION YIELD LIMIT WITH ATTENDANT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND THE LIMIT ON YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION SHOTS, IT WOULD SHARPEN THE CHOICE FACING THEM AND FACILITATE THEIR ANALYSIS. THIS POINT COULD BE MADE IN A GENERAL WAY, OR IT COULD BE MADE SPECIFIC BY OFFERING TO ELIMINATE THE REQUIREMENT ON FISSION LIMIT AND CORRESPONDING VERIFICATION

PROVISIONS IF INDIVIDUAL YIELDS ARE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 150 KILOTONS. THIS WOULD IMPLY US ACCEPTANCE OF A LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL YIELDS HIGHER THAN 150 KILOTONS IF SOVIETS WERE TO AGREE TO FISSION YIELD LIMIT AND ITS VERIFICATION. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO CATERGORICALLY REJECT THE IDEA OF A YIELD LIMIT HIGHER THAN 150 KILOTONS AND WITHDRAW THE FISSION YIELD REQUIREMENT.

(E) IT SEEMS CLEAR TO US THAT AN ADDITIONAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED, AND SOVIET SIDE SEEMS TO BELIEVE THIS ALSO. DELEGATION BELIEVE A BREAK IN THE NEAR FUTURE, E.G., BY MARCH 22, WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW03488
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750092-0172
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750346/aaaabpib.tel
Line Count: 343
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; WITHDRAWN <21 OCT 2003 by greeneet, REFER TO DOE>; RELEASED <27 OCT 2003 by GolinoFR>; APPROVED <27 OCT 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS TTBT/PNE DELEGATIONS MESSAGE NUMBER FORTY-SIX
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006